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The Philosophy and Economics of EU
Consumer Law contrasted with Indian
Consumer Law and Practice
Prof. Dr. H.C. Norbert Reich*
Abstract
Having been invited to this prestigious conference I first want to clarify what
I want to talk about. The topic which has been assigned to me by the convenor in
the framework of the GNLU Law and Economics Conference and which I readily
accepted is a complex one because of the wealth of material both with regard to
legislation and interpreting case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). I
have – frequently with colleagues – written extensively on the subject matter, the
last being a 400 p treatise on European Consumer Law.1 To make things somewhat
easier for you, I have prepared an Annex I concerning first an overview of EU
legislation and regulation, and an Annex II linking the philosophy and economics
of EU consumer law to certain images of the consumer. Annex III is concerned
with some findings on Indian consumer law which I prepared during two stays in
India in 2013 and 2014, namely in New Delhi and in Bangalore in the context of
a project managed by GIZ, the German development agency, with your Ministry
of consumer affairs and where I had a chance to take interviews with academics,
judges, consumer activists, and state officials. My findings were published in a
German Festschrift2 and will also be available to the Indian reader.
The structure of my paper will follow the Annexes. In a sort of overview, I will
explain some of the specifics of EU consumer law – I will do that without going
into any details so that we know what we are talking about (II). More extensive
parts (III) will discuss the different and sometimes conflicting consumer images
in EU law and propose a differentiated approach (IV) based on CJEU case law
and referring to findings of recently quite popular behavioural economics. The last
*
1
2

Emeritus, University of Bremen Law Faculty; Paper presented as part of GNLU
Conference on March 14-15, 2015.
Reich/Micklitz/Rott/Tonner, European Consumer Law, 2nd edition 2014 (Cambridge/
Intersentia).
Reflections on Hans Micklitz’ Plea of a Movable System (of Consumer Law) – Anything
to Learn from the Experiences of Indian Consumer Law, in: Purnhagen/Rott, Varieties
of European Economic Law and Regulation, Liber amicorum Hans Micklitz, 2014, 651674 (Indian) International Journal on Consumer Law and Practice, 2014 No.2, 1-31.
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part (V) will come to some observations which I made during may work in India
– you’re invited to discuss and even criticise them if you think my assessment is
wrong. Due to time reasons I will present my findings about Indian consumer law
only in an overview in the Annex but I will circulate my Festschrift paper to the
participants of the conference.

An Overview of EU Consumer Law and Practice

Legislation on consumer law in the EU – which was then called
“European Economic Community” (EEC) - started 30 years ago with the
adoption of the product liability directive 85/374/EEC;3 a rather minor
directive on misleading advertising had been already adopted in 1984 but
has now been supplemented and extended by the more recent Directives
2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices4 (in B2C marketing) and
2006/114/EC on Misleading and Comparative Advertising (in B2B
relations).5 After this initial phase a number of EEC/EC/EU-Directives
followed, mostly relating to consumer contract law. The most important
ones had been Dir. 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts6
and 99/44 on Sales of Consumer Goods.7 A consolidation of prior directives
was enacted in 2011 by the so-called “Consumer Rights Directive” (CRD)
2011/83,8 relating mostly to so-called off-premises and distance contracts
and containing not only detailed information requirements but also a right
of withdrawal of the consumer of 14 days after contract conclusion resp.
delivery of the good.
3
4
5
6
7
8

Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability
for defective products [1985] L 210/29.
Directive 2005/29/EC of the EP and the Council of 11 May 2005 on Unfair Commercial
Practices, [2005] OJ L 149/22.
Directive 2006/114/EC of the EP and the Council of 12 December 2006 on misleading
and comparative advertising [2006] L 376/21.
Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts
[1993] OJ L 95/29.
Directive 1999/44/EC of the EP and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects
of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees [1999] OJ L 171/12.
Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EU of the EP and the Council of 25 October 2011
(CRD), [2011] OJ L 304/64.
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Worth mentioning is also a – somewhat specific – Directive 2004/114/
EC prohibiting any – direct or indirect – discrimination based on gender
in the “sale and supply of goods or services available to the public”. The
same discrimination prohibition concerning race or ethnic origin has been
enacted by Dir. 2000/43.10 I will refer to that in the context of collective
consumer interests protected by EU law.
9

Another area where the EU legislator has been particularly active are
financial services, in particular consumer credit by Directive 2008/4811 and,
with regard to mortgage credit, recently Directive 2014/17/EU.12 Consumers
in the EU will have a right to a bank account with basic features from 2016
on according to Dir. 2014/92.13
Commercial practices have found a comprehensive regulation in the
above mentioned Dir. 2005/29. Access to justice which is usually a matter
of Member States under Art. 19(1) s. 2 of the EU-Treaty has recently been
improved by imposing ADR systems of conflict resolution on Member
States by Dir. 2013/1114 and Regulation 524/2013.15 Questions of liability in
tort have proven to be much more difficult to harmonisation and – with the
exception of the Product liability directive - have been left to coordination
by a conflict of law regulation (called Rome II) 864/200716 – of course
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of
equal treatment between women and men in the access to and supply of goods and
services [2004] OJ L 373/37.
Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L 180/22.
Directive 2008/48/EC of the EP and the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements
for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC [2008] OJ 122/66.
Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 4 February 2014
on credit agreements relating to residential immovable property, [2014] OJ L 60/34.
Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014
on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching
and access to payment accounts with basic features, [2014] OJ L 257/214.
Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 May 2013 on
consumer ADR, [2013] OJ L 165/13.
Regulation (EU) No. 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21
May 2013 on Consumer ADR [2013] OJ L 165/1.
Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the EP and the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ L 199/1.
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with the exception of product liability which was only slightly modified
in 1999 but was not extended to services. There is now a recently adopted
Directive on competition damages 2014/10417 which has only an indirect
relevance to consumer protection.
EU consumer law, particular in the area of contract, looks quite
impressive, but it is far from comprehensive. That is why Member State
contract law still plays a prominent role in consumer protection and has to
be coordinated by an internationally applicable conflict-of law instrument,
namely Reg. 593 /2008,18 the so called Rome I-regime. It contains a
specific consumer protection provision in Art. 6 intending to preserve
to the consumer the application of his or her home law when having
been approached for contracting in the country of residence. There is no
codification of consumer law at EU level, unlike in France, Italy or Spain.
As you could see from this overview, most of EU-consumer law
is contained in so–called directives. They are now based on Art. 114
TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the EU as adopted under the Lisbon
instruments of 2009) giving the EU a broad competence for so-called
internal market measures which should take as a starting point a high level
of consumer protection – an objective repeated in other provisions of the
Treaty (Art.12, 169 TFEU) and in Art. 38 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights in the EU of 2009. According to Art. 288 TFEU, directives are
binding on Member States with regard to “the result to be achieved...but
shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.”
Directives must therefore be implemented by Member State legislation;
they do not on their own create rights and obligations of private parties.
There is of course much debate on details of these provisions which will
not be outlined here. The situation is different with EU-regulations which
17 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 November
2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements
of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union,
[2014] OJ L 349/1.
18 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the EP and the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law
applicable to contractual obligations (“Rome I”) [2008] OJ L 176/6.
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have been used in particular for conflict-of-law questions under a different
competence provision, namely Art. 81TFEU.
Directives only selectively regulate questions of consumer law; their
scope depends on the extent of harmonisation – a rather controversial
issue in EU-law which I cannot discuss in any detail. EU lawyers usually
distinguish between “minimum” and “full” harmonisation, the first
allowing Member States setting a minimum threshold but allow to provide
for “better” consumer protection, the second setting both the upper and
lower threshold of protection itself. In the beginning, EU law started
with minimum harmonisation - with the exception of product liability in
Dir. 85/374; later directives imposed a more or less “full” or “complete”
harmonisation on Member States to avoid a drifting apart of laws, which
however is limited to the extent of harmonisation itself. For example, the
consumer credit directives 2008/48 and 2014/17 have fully harmonised
the requirements of pre-contractual and contractual information, but have
excluded questions of consumer over-indebtedness, default on repayment,
setting of interest rates and default costs, consumer bankruptcy and the like,
except for a warning obligation imposed on the creditor.
I cannot finish this overview without mentioning the role of the CJEU.
According to Art. 267 TFEU it can – in certain cases it must - be called
upon by Member State courts or tribunals to deliver judgments concerning
the interpretation of EU law, once a question is raised in a litigation in
Member States. As I will show later, the case law of the CJEU has played
an enormous role in the development of EU consumer law – much of it
has now become “case law” almost in the common law tradition familiar
to Indian lawyers! This cannot be understood without a close look at the
different consumer “images” which EU law has used and which we will
distinguish as the “informed”, the “weak” and the “vulnerable” consumer
standard, added by remarks about collective consumer interests, to which
I will turn now with some detail which may be of interest to my Indian
colleagues.
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Consumer Images in EU Law
2.1. The “Informed Consumer” Standard

Community and now Union law proceed from the premise that the EU
consumer law should be based on the model of an “informed consumer”.
Consumer protection understood as a form of social protection is generally
the responsibility of the Member States within the framework of minimum
harmonization measures, as recognised by the CJEU in Buet already in
1989.19 Under the new framework of full harmonisation the Member
State’s discretion in the field of social protection depends on the scope
of application of EU measures. In the area of consumer credit, under
Directives 2008/48/EC and 2014/17, questions of social protection of the
consumer-debtor against usury, default and insolvency are left to Member
State law. EU consumer protection law generally belongs to economic, not
social, law. A somewhat more “social approach” has been attempted in
Article 28 of the Mortgage Credit Directive, which concerns “arrears and
foreclosure”. Even there, however, the provision leaves much discretion to
Member States as to how to implement these consumer protective measures.
Article 11(1)(g) requires the Member States to ensure that the standard
information any advertising concerning credit agreements includes “a
general warning concerning possible consequences of non-compliance with
the commitments linked to the credit agreement.” It is of no surprise that
the information requirements are mandatory for the Member States, and
in consequence for credit providers, while the social protective provisions
on foreclosure and arrears remain more or less optional.
The Union legislator – and to an even larger extent the Commission –
rely on the effects of the internal market and on competition in delivering
19 Case 382/87, [1989] ECR 1235; thereto J. Stuyck, in: L. Krämer et al., Law and
diffuse interests, (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1997) 287; G. Howells/Th. Wilhelmsson, EC
Consumer Law, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 1997) 315-320; St. Weatherill and H.-W. Micklitz,
in: Grundmann/Kerber/Weatherill, Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the
Internal Market, (Berlin, de Gruyter, 2001) 173, 185-187, 197, 200; E. Hondius, The
protection of the weak party in a harmonised European contract law, (2004) 27 Journal
of Consumer Policy (JCP) 245.
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consumer welfare. For liberal authors, the right to free choice constitutes
the core ingredient of the European economic constitution20 because it is
necessary for the exercise “the individual rights of the citizens to participate
in cross-border transactions in accordance with Community law”. Consumer
protection extends these liberties to “passive citizens”.21 According to this
view consumer protection excessively limiting the freedom of contract may
hamper rather than enhance market integration.22
Consumer protection measures adopted by the EU focusing on the right
to information reflect the policy choices taken by the Treaty, as visible
in the wording of Article 169 TFEU.23 They are regarded as compatible
with a market economy. Socio-political, distributive demands are less
important.24 These issues are left to the Member States, in accordance, one
could argue, with the principle of subsidiarity under Art. 5(3) TEU. It is due
to the principle of subsidiarity that the finish author Wilhelmsson objects
excessive unification of European contract law where “social values” are
unlikely to be adequately considered.25
2.2. The “Weaker” Consumer in the Case-Law of the CJEU

As far as the application and interpretation of European consumer law
directives are concerned, the practice of the CJEU shows the tendency to
emphasise the protection of the consumer as a weaker party in a contractual
relationship.26 The battlefield is the interpretation of Directive 93/13/EC.
Here a steady influx of references, in particular from the new Member
20 Critical discussion thereof in M. Kenny, The Transformation of Public and Private
EC Competition Law, (Berne, Stämpfli, 2002) 86-93; B. Lurger, Grundfragen der
Vereinheitlichung des Vertragsrechts in der EU, (Wien, Springer, 2002) 396-400.
21 Reich, General Principles of EU Civil Law, 2014, paras 1.5-1.9.
22 Chr. Kirchner, in: St. Grundmann/W. Kerber/St. Weatherill at 165.
23 For an overview see the contributions in Grundmann/Kerber/Weatherill.
24 Cf. Wilhelmsson, Social Contract Law and European Integration (Aldershot, Dartmouth,
1995); differing opinion Willet, Can Disallowance of Unfair Contract Terms Be Regarded
as a Redistribution of Power in Favour of Consumers?, (1994) 17 JCP 471.
25 T. Wilhelmsson, Private Law in the EU: Harmonised or Fragmented Europeanisation?,
(2002) European Review of Private Law (ERPL) 77, 84; similar view Reich, A European
Contract Law or an EU Contract Law Regulation for Consumers?, (2005) 28 JCP 383.
26 CJEU, 13 December 2001, C-481/99, Heininger, [2001] ECR I-9945, para 38.
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States (those who became members after 2004), but also from the Member
States suffering more harshly from the Euro crisis (for example Spain), is
matched by the Court’s readiness to take consumer protection ‘much more
seriously’.27 In order to understand the protective ambit of the Unfair Terms
Directive, as interpreted by the CJEU, it is helpful to recall a statement
from the Penzügij Lizing judgment,28 which the Court makes repeatedly to
justify its more consumer protective interpretation of the Directive:
... according to settled case-law, the system of protection introduced
by the Directive is based on the idea that the consumer is in a
weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as regards both his
bargaining power and his level of knowledge. This leads to the
consumer agreeing to terms drawn up in advance by the seller or
supplier without being able to influence the content of those terms….
The Court of Justice has also held that, on account of that weaker
position, Article 6(1) of the Directive provides that unfair terms are
not binding on the consumer. As is apparent from case‑law, that is
a mandatory provision which aims to replace the formal balance
which the contract establishes between the rights and obligations of
the parties with an effective balance which re-establishes equality
between them … In order to guarantee the protection intended by the
Directive, the Court has also stated that the imbalance which exists
between the consumer and the seller or supplier may be corrected
only by positive action unconnected with the actual parties to the
contract.
This case law overtly concerns only Directive 93/13 but the Court’s
approach should be regarded as indicating more generally the Court’s
27

H.-W. Micklitz/N. Reich, Von der Klausel- zur Marktkontrolle, (2013) 24 Zeitschrift für
Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht,(EuZW) 457; same, The Court and Sleeping Beauty - The
revival of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review
(CMLRev), 771; the leading case is CJEU, C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v Catalinyacaixa,
judgment of 14 March 2013.

28 CJEU, 9.11.2010, C-137/08 VB Penzügji Lizing v Schneider, [2010] ECR

I-10847 at para 46.
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understanding of the objectives of EU consumer law. In B2C transactions
party autonomy is tipped in favour of the consumer as a typically weaker
party. The business or professional party is regularly seen to be in a stronger
bargaining position.
The CJEU seems even to be willing to improve existing remedies in
directives. It does so both in a formal and in a substantive sense. Directive
93/13/EEC has led to a number of surprising judgments that have insisted
on the principle of effective protection justified by the unequal bargaining
power of the parties, lately highlighted by the Invitel and Aziz judgments.29
This results in the requirement for national courts to apply ex officio certain
protective provisions, in particular Article 6 of the Directive on the nonbinding consequence of unfair terms. The case law began with Océano,
concerning jurisdiction clauses,30 was continued in Claro31 and Asturcom,32
in relation to arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, and was confirmed
and refined in Pannon.33
The court seized of the action is therefore required to ensure the
effectiveness of the protection intended to be given by the provisions of
the Directive. Consequently, the role thus attributed to the national court
by Community law in this area is not limited to a mere power to rule on the
29 Case C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyaszróvédelni Hatóság v Invitel [2012] ECR I-(26.4.2012);
comment H.-W. Micklitz/N. Reich, ‘AGB-Recht und UWG – (endlich) ein Ende des
Kästchendenkens nach Pernivoca und Invitel’, EWS (Europäisches Wirtschafts- und
Steuerrecht) 2012, 257; the prior opinion AG Trstenjak of 6 December 2011 has been
commented on by H.-W. Micklitz/N. Reich, EuZW 2012, 126.
30 Joined Cases C-240-244/98 Océano Grupo ed. v Quintero et al. [2000] ECR I-4941.
31 Case C-168/05 E.M.M. Claro v Centro Movil Milenium [2006] ECR I-10421.
32 Case C-40/08 Asturcom v Christina Rodrigues Nogueria [2009] ECR I-9579; comment
H. Schebasta, ‘Does the National Court Know European Law’, in: H.-W. Micklitz/N.
Reich (eds,), ‘The Impact of the Internal Market on the Private Law of Member
Countries’, EUI Working Papers 2009/22, 47 = ERPrL 2010, 847, insisting that in
Asturcom, which concerned a consumer who “in total inertia” did not raise any defence
against arbitration proceedings, including the res judicata of the final award against her
(para 34), the CJEU did not apply the effectiveness principle, but rather the less stringent
equivalence test.
33 Case C-243/08 Pannon v Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi [2009] ECR I-4713; see also case
C-137/08 VB Penzügyi Lizing v Ferenc Schneider [2010] ECR I-10847, para 56,
concerning investigation on its own motion whether the court has jurisdiction or not
according to the disputed clause.
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possible unfairness of a contractual term, but also consists of the obligation
to examine that issue of its own motion, where it has available to it the legal
and factual elements necessary for that task, including when it is assessing
whether it has territorial jurisdiction (para 32 of Pannon).
Regarding substantive law, the battleground has been the Consumer
Sales Directive 99/44. The leading cases are Weber and Putz34 decided by the
Court on 16 June 2011; they are a good, and at the same time controversial,
example of the impact of EU law on traditional ideas on remedies in sales
law beyond the wording of Directive 99/44. They concern reimbursement
of additional costs by the consumer for replacing a defective product
and installing an improved one, for example by tearing off and replacing
defective tiles used for floor panelling, or by disconnecting and reconnecting
a dishwasher that did not function. The reasoning of the Court is based on
the rather vague provisions in the Directive that repair and replacement
should be done within “a reasonable time”, “free of charge” and “without
significant inconvenience to the consumer”, even if the contract did not
include installation services. This creates a strict liability regime for the
seller, not only for the act of replacing the defective product itself, but also
for the resulting follow-up costs even after the transfer of the risk. If the
replacement would lead to disproportionate costs for the seller, he could
reduce them “to an amount proportionate to the value the goods would
have if there were no lack of conformity and the significance of the lack of
conformity” (para 74). The consumer would not get full reimbursement of
his costs. The reference point is not therefore the (possibly much higher) cost
of removal of the defective product or/and the installation of a conforming
product, but its lower net value. This seems to be a fair balancing of the
different interests of the parties.
It is hard to predict where this development will lead. The CJEU
is narrowing down the leeway of the Member States’ to set their own
34 Joined Cases C-65/09 + C-87/09, Gebr. Weber et al. v J. Wittmer et al. [2011] ECR
I-5257.
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protective standards within the framework of EU measures. In this way, the
CJEU seems to be counterbalancing the much harsher market-orientated
philosophy motivating the European Commission, and to some extent also
the European legislator.
2.3. The “Vulnerable” Consumer Standard35

If we look at the concept of “vulnerable consumers” as it emerges from
existing EU legislation it seems to encompass, still rather superficially,
those who cannot, or can no longer, cope with the requirements of the
modern consumer society. Some consumers run the risk of being isolated
from social and economic life, be it by over-indebtedness, disabilities, or
a lack of possibilities to communicate. There is also a growing problem of
“social deprivation”. This group of consumers was the focus of the national
consumer policies of the 1960s and ‘70s. The political movement of those
decades concentrated on protecting in particular vulnerable persons without
differentiation. This was taken up by the EU in the Lisbon Strategy of
1999 where the EU mentioned, for the first time explicitly, the existence
of different types of consumers. It speaks of, as a separate group, humans
“living below the poverty line and in social exclusion”.36
Improved information and market transparency are of little help
to vulnerable consumers when the goal is to enable them to lead selfdetermined life. It is rather the targeted improvement of infrastructure, and
intelligent, realistic schemes of providing advice, that enable consumers,
including vulnerable consumers, to participate independently in economic
and social life. If one declares inclusion and social participation as the
objective, as the EU does, then one also has to take care of “vulnerable
consumers”.37 Amazingly enough, the vulnerable consumer has entered
35 This section follows Micklitz/Reich, in: European Consumer Law, (Cambridge,
Intersentia, 2nd ed. 2014) para 1.36a.
36 COM(2010) 2020 3.3.2010, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm, last
accessed 31.07.12.
37 http://www.bmelv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Ministry/Trusting-VulnerableResponsible-Consumer.pdf.
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the European consumer policy agenda. Recital 34 of the Consumer Rights
Directive (CRD) 2011/83/EU insists that:
In providing that information, the trader should take into account the
specific needs of consumers who are vulnerable because of their mental,
physical or psychological infirmity, age or credulity in a way which the
trader could reasonably be expected to foresee. However, taking into
account such specific needs should not lead to different levels of consumer
protection.
However, the obligation mentioned in the recital did not make it into the
specific information requirements of the provisions of the CRD!
Legal recognition of this new type of consumer is closely linked to the
liberalization of the energy and telecommunication markets, which was
strongly promoted by the European Commission after the adoption of the
Single European Act in 1987. The guarantee of supply for everybody was
added to the concept of universal services. The universal service obligation
not only refers to vulnerable consumers but actually includes them in its
protective realm by giving them certain basic rights. For the first time
the concept appears in Directive 2002/22/EC on universal services and
users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services
(Universal Service Directive).38
Article 1(1) of the Universal Service Directive aims at ensuring the
availability throughout the Community of good quality publicly available
services through effective competition and choice and further, aims to deal
with circumstances “in which the needs of end-users are not satisfactorily
met by the market”. According to the 7th recital, the Directive’s objective
is to ensure “the same conditions [of] access, in particular for the elderly,
the disabled and for people with special social needs”. Directive 2009/140/
EC has not changed the terms defined in Article 2 of Directive 2002/21/
38 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002
on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks
and services (Universal Service Directive) [2002] OJ L108/51.
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EC. For the first time disabled persons are granted special rights.39 In the
Internal Market in Electricity Directive 2003/54/EC and the Internal Market
in Natural Gas Directive 2003/55/EC,40 the so-called second generation
of the liberalization of the energy markets, the European Commission
coined the notion of the “vulnerable customer”.41 In light of the increasing
problems of social exclusion as a consequence of the liberalization of the
Single European Market, the EU further tightened its approach in Directive
2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009.42 However, the EU has left it to the Member
States to define the term of vulnerable consumers and to implement their
protection, as Article 3(7) of the Directive indicates, including protection
against disconnection.
The differentiation between categories of consumers in Directive
2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial Practices can also be considered to
have an impact on traditional contract law understanding which usually
starts from a rather abstract and uniform concept of “persons”. Interestingly
the Directive does not speak of the “vulnerable consumer”, but of
“consumers whose characteristics make them particularly vulnerable” to
unfair commercial practices. This concept includes consumers whose “age,
physical or mental infirmity or credulity that render them susceptible”.
39 Arts 7 and 23a of Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’
rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/
EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the
electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation
between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection
laws [2009] OJ L337/11 ; for an evaluation see Nijenhuis, in: F. Benyon, Services and
the EU Citizen, (Oxford, Hart, 2013) at pp. 56.
40 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive
96/92/EC - Statements made with regard to decommissioning and waste management
activities [2003] OJ L176/37; Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural
gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC [2003] OJ L176/57.
41 Compare Art. 3 (5) Directive 2003/54/EC and Art. 3 (3) 2003/55/EC, ‘vulnerable
consumer respectively vulnerable customer’.
42 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive
2003/54/EC [2009] OJ L211/55.
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Poverty does not account for the concept of vulnerability.43 The law does
not define the characteristics of the “normal addressee of an advertisement”,
who in the Directive is spoken of as the “average consumer”.
Finally, the more recent Regulation (EU) No. 524/2013 on consumer
ODR refers to “vulnerable users” in its Article 5 concerning the most
inclusive possible access and use of the ODR-platform by all, including
“vulnerable users (‘design for all’)”. The Regulation, does not, however,
contain a definition of “vulnerable users”.
Persons with physical disabilities, on the other hand, have entered
EU law in different regulations relating to passenger transportation, even
though the concept of “vulnerability” is not used in their respect. Article
2(1) of Regulation 261/200444 talks of persons with “reduced mobility,”
“who require special services and attention by airlines. There has been
a remarkable extension of the obligations of airlines by the CJEU, for
instance in cases of interruption of traffic due to the volcanic eruption of the
Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull, leading to the closure of air space. There
the Court used Article 9 of the Regulation to grant entitlements to stranded
passengers, which were unlimited in time and value and did not distinguish
between the different types of passengers. One could argue that in these
circumstances every passenger was in some way an ad-hoc “vulnerable
consumer” with reduced mobility, not due to the personal situation but due
to the closure of air traffic. The Court wrote in its McDonough-judgment45
concerning the care an air carrier owed to passengers’ flight interruption
which was due to a volcanic eruption:
43 Compare Directive 2005/29/EC Art.5(3)…clearly identifiable group of consumers who
are ‘which mentioned as ‘particularly vulnerable’.
44 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers
in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights [2004] OJ
L46/1. The Commission’s proposal for amending the regulation (COM(2013) 130 final)
of 13 March.2013 has been critically discussed by Müller-Rostin, (2013) 2 euvr 138;
I will not go into this discussion.
45 CJEU, C-12/11, McDonagh v Ryanair, judgment of 31 January 2013.
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“…the provision of care to such passengers is particularly
important in the case of extraordinary circumstances which persist
over a long time and it is precisely in situations where the waiting
period occasioned by the cancellation of a flight is particularly
lengthy that it is necessary to ensure that an air passenger whose
flight has been cancelled can have access to essential goods and
services throughout that period” (para 42).
2.4. The Collective Dimension and the Problem of Discrimination

“Consumers, by definition, include us all”, as President Kennedy
famously said in his consumer message of 1962.46 This statement seems
to exclude a collective dimension of consumer protection, whatever the
consumer image which it tends to protect. Therefore, consumer protection
depends on the activity of the individual consumer which is injured in
contracting or by some other illegal behaviour of the professional. Usually,
the consumer must defend his/her rights before a court of law or a similar
institution, including now an ADR mechanism.
Practice shows that the individual judicial process is not always suited
to sufficiently supervising obedience of the laws. In general, the consumer
as an individual will avoid legal proceedings for a number of reasons.
Often legal proceedings are not commenced as the damage is only minor,
and assertion of a claim by an individual would not be worth it. There is
also a certain wariness of legal institutions as well as the fear of bringing
a claim against a well-known undertaking. This is to the detriment of the
collective interest of consumers, as the passivity of consumers allows
undertakings to continue their illegal practices and in so doing harm an
unidentifiable number of consumers. So far, collective legal protection has
failed as a result of consumers’ lack of power as a genuine counterpart to
business, itself a result of the lack of organisation of the consumers as a
46 See the note by E. Hondius, The Innovative Nature of Consumer Law, 35 (2012) JCP
165.
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group. The falling apart of objective law and subjective legal protection
of the individual justifies the introduction of collective legal protection.
Collective legal protection relates to the “abstract” competence
of consumer associations to assert a claim and bring an action; these
associations need not be in a legal relationship with the defendants.
Consumer associations can take action without having to satisfy the
requirement that the review of the conduct in question is in their own legal
interest. In fact, the protection of individual interests is of little concern;
this, however, does not prevent the establishment of a competence based on
a public interest test. Asserting a claim for “de-individualised” consumer
rights by bringing a legal action results in an institutional “system of
guarantees” for the protection of the consumer. Collective protection leads
to a transition from an individual’s subjective rights being affected to a
wider group of consumers being affected collectively, for example by unfair
terms or misleading advertising, thus synchronising public and private law.
As the CJEU wrote in its Henkel case47 concerning jurisdiction for actions
of consumer associations:
“The legal basis for its action [of the consumer association] is a
right conferred by statute for the purpose of preventing the use of
terms which the legislature considers to be unlawful in dealings
between a professional and a private final consumer”.
EU law has recognized a right of action of consumer associations in such
important directives as Unfair Terms, 93/13, Unfair Commercial Practices
under Dir. 2005/29 and Consumer Rights under the recently adopted Dir.
2011/83. Directive 2009/22/EC of 23 April 200948 on injunctions for the
protection of consumers’ interests, pursues as an objective the access
of consumers and consumer associations to justice. By regulating the
right of consumer associations to take legal action, the Directive also
47 CJEU 1 October 2002, C-167/00, Verein für Konsumenteninformation (VKI)/Karl Heinz
Henkel, [2002] ECR I-8111, para 39.
48 [2009] OJ L 110/30.
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applies to purely national circumstances. This represents a further step in
approximating the procedural provisions.
In its Consumer Policy Strategy 2007–201349 the Commission wrote
that it will consider taking action on collective redress mechanisms for
consumers both for infringements of consumer protection rules and for
breaches of EU antitrust rules in line with the 2005 Green Paper on private
damages actions. Some Member States have introduced different schemes
for collective redress of consumer injuries mostly based on an opt-in
scheme, not as an opt-mechanism as in the US class action system. The
general discussion in the European Parliament on collective redress has been
rather hostile, as a report of the legal committee of 12 January 2012 shows:
“a collective redress system where the victims are not identified
before the judgment is delivered must be rejected on the grounds
that it is contrary to many Member States’ legal orders and violates
the rights of any victims who might participate in the procedure
unknowingly and yet be bound by the court’s decision” (para 20).

The Commission has therefore not made any legislative proposals on that
subject, and instead has only released a Recommendation of 11 June 201350
rejecting any type of opt-out solution and leaving it to Member States to
define standing, admissibility and funding, and containing, surprisingly, a
prohibition on punitive damages and contingency fees. Unfortunately, the
Recommendation does not show any sincere concern for collective redress
of violations of consumer law and may even discourage Member States
from advancing legal reform; instead it seems to aim only at rejecting any
US class-action initiative.
A certain collective dimension can also be seen in Directive 2004/113
prohibiting discrimination with regard to gender. The constitutional
49 COM (2007) 99 final of 13.3.2007, 11.
50 COM (2013) 3539/3, [2013] OJ L 201/60; critical comment by A. Stadler, European
Developments in Collective Redress, [2014] euvr 80.
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dimension of this directive was before the CJEU in its Test Achats case.51
Its Art. 5(2) contained an exemption for insurance contracts:
Notwithstanding paragraph 1, Member States may decide before
21 December 2007 to permit proportionate differences in individuals’
premiums and benefits where the use of sex is a determining factor in the
assessment of risk based on relevant and accurate actuarial and statistical
data. The Member States concerned shall inform the Commission and
ensure that accurate data relevant to the use of sex as a determining actuarial
factor are compiled, published and regularly updated. These Member States
shall review their decision five years after 21 December 2007, taking into
account the Commission report referred to in Article 16, and shall forward
the results of this review to the Commission.
On 1 March 2011 the CJEU condemned the exemption from the nondiscrimination principle in insurance contracts by ruling in the judgment:
Article 5(2) of Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December
2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men
and women in the access to and supply of goods and services is
invalid with effect from 21 December 2013.
The judgment is surprisingly short.52 The CJEU shows its willingness
to control strictly the conformity of EU provisions with the human rights
regime to which the EU subscribed in a number of documents, the latest one
being the “elevated” Charter of Fundament Rights, which from 1 December
2009 has had the same value as the EU Treaties. The Court’s ruling is based
on several arguments, only some of them will be mentioned here. Most
important, the Court recognises that equality between men and women in
insurance contracts cannot be simply produced by “legal fiat”, but contains
51 CJEU C-236/09 Ass. Belge Test-Achats et al, [2011] ECR I-773.
52 Comment N. Reich, ‘Some Thoughts after the “Test Achats” Judgment’, [2011] EJRR,
283; K. Purnhagen, [2011] Euroaprecht (EuR) 690; C. Tobler, ‘Case note’,[2011]
CMLRev, 2041; P. Watson, ‘Equality, fundamental rights and the limits of legislative
discretion’, [2011] ELRev 896.
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an evolutionary element which must be “progressively achieved”.53 The EU
non-discrimination directives do not immediately forbid discrimination but
contain a mandatory political programme to be elaborated and implemented
over time. In order to fulfil this dynamic element of non-discrimination,
legislative action “must contribute, in a coherent manner, to the achievement
of the intended objective, without prejudice of providing for transitional
periods or derogations of limited scope”.54 The Court invalidated it, but
only with ex nunc consequences, beginning five years after the Directive’s
entry into force. This is a courageous step in order to give the legislator
time to remedy the complex political, economic or legal circumstances.
The CJEU expressly condemned the exemption in Article 5(2) as a
violation of the equality principle. In consistent case law, the CJEU defines
the principle of equal treatment as requiring that “comparable situations
must not be treated differently, and that different situations must not be
treated in the same way, unless such treatment is objectively justified”.55
Despite the different risk profiles of the sexes in certain types of insurance,
for example third party liability of car drivers, where men seem to take more
risks and are responsible for more accidents, on the one hand, and life and
health insurance, where women have a higher and more costly risk profile
according to relevant statistics, these differences were expressly ruled not
to be relevant by Article 5(1) of Directive 2004/113. Men and women,
despite the difference in life expectancy, have to be treated as “normatively
comparable” even though “empirically different”.56 The CJEU did not find
any justification for this differentiation to continue without a time limit. It
amounted to a “pure and simple” discrimination to persist indefinitely.57
In order to remedy this situation, the Court took upon itself the position of
legislator and imposed a time limit of its own accord, without invalidating
the entire legislative act. As a consequence, existing insurance contracts
53
54
55
56
57

Ibid., at para 20.
Ibid., at para 21.
Ibid., at para 28.
See ibid., at para 30.
Ibid., at para 33.
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with different premiums, tariffs and benefits for men and women that
are not overtly inconsistent with Article 5(2) can be maintained until 20
December 2012, but may not be offered from 21 December 2012 onwards,
when “unisex” tariffs will become mandatory.
The Need for a Differentiated Treatment of the
Different Consumer Images – Some Critical Remarks
3.1. Critique of the “Information Paradigm of EU Law”

The “informed consumer standard” has been the basis of many EU
provisions. It is based on the model of the consumer as a rational “homo
oeconomicus”. The consumer right of information has already been part of
Article 169(1) TFEU (ex-Article 153(1) EC), can be found in great detail
in many consumer law directives, and must be regarded as a “general
principle” of EU consumer law, to be balanced with the other principle of
autonomy of business in consumer contracting.58 Article 5 of the CRD has
codified this general right as a condition to a binding contract:
Before the consumer is bound by a contract other than a distance or
off-premises contract, or any corresponding offer, the trader shall provide
the consumer with the following information in a clear and comprehensible
manner, if that information is not already apparent from the context.
Article 5(1)(a) to (h) lists in detail what that information consists of, for
example the main characteristics of the goods or services, the total price of
the goods or services inclusive of taxes (VAT), the duration of the contract
and as a novelty, “where applicable, the functionality, including applicable
technical protection measures, of digital content and any interoperability of
digital content with hardware and software that the trader is aware of or can
reasonably be expected to have been aware of”.59 Paragraph 3 contains an
exception for day-to-day transactions that are to be performed immediately,
58 See N. Reich in H.-W. Micklitz/N. Reich/P. Rott/K. Tonner, Understanding EU Consumer
Law, 2nd ed. 2014, para 1.11.
59 For details see N. Helberger et al., ‘Digital Content Contracts for Consumers’, 36 [2013)
JCP 37 at 46.
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while paragraph 4 allows Member States to adopt or maintain additional
pre-contractual requirements. Article 6 contains similar requirements for
off-premises and distance contracts, with some specificities concerning
additional information about the right of withdrawal and the consequences
in case of withdrawal.
These information requirements have been extended by a right of
withdrawal, a so-called “cooling-off period” in certain areas of contracting,
to allow the consumer who has been caught in situations of restrictive
decision-making (off-premises contracts), or who may be entering into a
transaction where s/he does not know enough about the good or service
to be provided (distance selling), or where s/he may not immediately
understand the service because of its complexity and inherent risks (for
example insurance, timeshare or consumer credit).
The usefulness and effectiveness of these information requirements has
been subject to a controversial debate which ranges, on the one extreme,
from criticism of the merely symbolic character of these regulations that
are based on a model of the “rational informed consumer” contradicted by
behavioural studies,60 to a more traditional critique fearing an erosion of the
pacta sunt servanda principle, “protecting” the irresponsible consumer and
putting unnecessary costs on business.61 I will not go into this discussion,
even though it is true that EU law tends to provide for a certain – and highly
selective and specific - “overkill of information duties”.62 These duties do
not contain “personalised information” even if necessary. Instead of an
“information excess,” information must be framed so as to meet consumer

60 See the spical issue 34 (2011) JCP 271-398 with conbtributions by A. Atzoni, S. Frerichs,
G. Spinbdler, M.G. Faure & H.A. Luth. W.H. van Boom, J. Trzaskowski, M. Lissowska.
61 M. Engel & J. Stark, Verbraucherrecht ohne Verbraucher (Consumer law without
consumers), (2015) Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (ZeuP) 32.
62 G. Howells/T. Wilhelmsson, ‘EC Consumer Law – Has it Come of Age’, (2003) ELR 370;
R. Sefton-Green (ed.). Mistake, Fraud and Duties to Information, 2005, 396; P. Giliker,
‘Pre-contractual good faith and CESL’, (2013) ERPL, 79 at 98; N. Reich, ‘The Social,
Political, and Cultural Dimension of EU Private Law’, in: R. Schulze/H. Schulte-Nölke,
European Private Law – Current Status and Perspectives, 2011, 80.
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demands. Not more but better information is necessary.63 The current
requirements are at best a mere minimum of protection.
As information rights they should correspond to the pronouncement of
Article 169(1) TFEU and to a specific understanding of EU fundamental
freedoms from the perspective of proportionality.64 Four main questions
remain:65
•

Are information rules sufficient to give the consumer a fair chance
to participate in consumer markets as a “passive market citizen”?

•

Are information rules efficient in achieving their objective of
strengthening party autonomy and consumer choice?

•

Are information provisions effectively implemented?

•

Are information provisions used as an element in limiting liability
of the business party?66

The “information overkill” provided for by EU law, in particular in
consumer credit transactions, is contrasted by finding of behavioural studies
of the limits of use, usefulness, and usability of information due to limited
heuristics of consumers. Consumers are not in general risk-averse; therefore,
abstract warnings on the consequences of certain transactions, e.g., against
overextending the use of credit, will not be considered as specific risks
to take account of, while on the other hand positive but only potential
and rather unlikely benefits will be exaggerated in their meaning, e.g., in
games of chance – there is an asymmetry between loss aversion vs. positive
expectations.67 The model of the “average consumer who is reasonably well
informed and reasonably observant and circumspect” which plays such an
63 N. Helberger et al., Digital Consumers and the Law, 2012, pp. 68.
64 H.-W. Micklitz/N. Reich/P. Rott, K. Tonner, Understanding EU Consumer Law, paras
1.11-1.14.
65 N. Reich, Yearbook of Consumer Law 2009, 2010, 8.
66 N. Helberger et al., supra note 63, at 95.
67 More details in Kahneman, Thinking Fast Slow, (Penguin 2012), at pp. 278 et sq. on
“prospect theory.”
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important role in the case law of the CJEU68 amounts in reality to a rather
irrational model of consumer behaviour.
Critique has also been voiced against the broad scope of withdrawal
rights in particular in distance contracts which may create an incentive for
opportunistic behaviour of consumers: they might be encouraged to order
goods which they can return without risk of payment after 14 days to check
their quality, but in reality use them for short-time purposes like a wedding
or other event without ever intending to pay the full purchase price. To some
extent, the CJEU in its Messner-judgement69 recognised this possibility
of abuse and allowed Member State law to provide for measures avoid it:
However, although Directive 97/7 (the predecessor of the CRD, NR)
is designed to protect the consumer in the particular situation of a
distance contract, it is not intended to grant him rights going beyond
what is necessary to allow him effectively to exercise his right of
withdrawal. Consequently, the purpose of the Directive does not
preclude, in principle, a legal provision of a Member State which
requires a consumer to pay fair compensation in the case where he
has made use of the goods acquired under a distance contract in a
manner incompatible with the principles of civil law, such as those
of good faith or unjust enrichment.

Art. 14 (2) of the CRD has taken up this possibility of limiting consumer
rights: the consumer can only examine the product free of compensation,
but has to take liability for diminished value of the goods because of their
being used as such.
68 Out of the many cases of the CJEU see case C-465/98 Darbo [2000] ECR I- 2297 at
para 22.
69 Case C-489/07 Messner v Firma Stefan Krüger, [2009] ECR I-7315 at para 25-26;
details Reich, General Principles of EU Civil Law at para 5.9.
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3.2. Mandatory Substantive Law as “Legal Paternalism”? Who Pays the
Bill?

The model of the “weak consumer” is supposed to be counteracted by EU
law containing unilaterally binding provisions from which the professional
cannot deviate to the disadvantage of the consumer. Mandatory consumer
contract law is the other, more “interventionist”, element of EU consumer
law. It can be found in many directives which expressly preclude the parties
to a B2C contract to contract-out of mandatory protective provisions (see
latest Article 25 CRD). But the extent of substantive rules is much more
limited in EU contract law, although it does exist, however selectively. In
areas like sales law under Directive 99/44/EC, the EU legislator certainly
wants to give the consumer a set of minimum rights that cannot be waived
by contract. In academic writing there is no agreement as to how far EU
law should go with regard to substantive fairness rules: some fear unwanted
“paternalism” (Grundmann/Ogus/ Wagner),70 while other authors, on the
contrary, in line with the “Manifesto” group,71 want to extend these rules
as basis for a “social justice agenda for European contract law”, namely to
“fairness”, “constitutionalisation of private law”, and “legitimacy modes
of governance”
The CRD as the most recent example contains some additional consumer
rights in Chapter 4, like those on delivery, passing of risk, and additional
payments. The CRD has however not really extended the scope and extent
of mandatory provisions of consumer contracting, even though that was
originally foreseen in the 2008 proposal, which, however, did not succeed
70 S. Grundmann/W. Kerber, ‘Information Intermediaries’, in: S. Grundmann/W. Kerber/S.
Weatherill (eds.), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the Internal Market,
2001, 264, preferring information-type rules over mandatory standards; A. Ogus, ‘The
paradoxes of legal paternalism and how to resolve them’,( 2010) Legal Studies, 61; G.
Wagner, Zwingendes Privatrecht, (2010) ZEuP, 243, pleading for a restrictive use of
mandatory rules in contract law.
71 Study Group on Social Justice, (2004) ELJ, 653 at 664; B. Lurger, ‘The Common Frame
of Reference/Optional Code and the Various Understandings of Social Justice in Europe’,
in: T. Wilhelmsson et al. (eds.), Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe, 2007,
177.
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due to its “full harmonisation approach”.72 One of the “last minute”
amendments to the proposal for a CRD now found in the final text is the
concept of “fees that exceed the cost borne by the trader for the use of
such means” (of payment) in Article 19. How is this to be calculated in a
simple and cost-effective way? The CJEU will have to give its answers at
a later date.
From an economic point of view, mandatory provisions in consumer
contract law function as a sort of insurance premium. However, this
premium is imposed on every consumer, whether they are risk averse or
not, whether they would be willing to pay the premium or not. It will have
to be included in the overall price of the product, whether the consumer
wants to pay the price or not. It may even create moral hazards encouraging
careless behaviour of consumers but making those who are able to protect
themselves or simply do not want protection to pay the bill. As a result,
there may be a transfer of costs from careless to careful and responsible
consumers. As a general tendency, so the hypothesis goes, prices will
increase because of mandatory consumer law which works in the end
against overall consumer welfare.
However, it seems to me that these fears are not really corroborated by
EU practice. Quite to the contrary, mandatory law can also be regarded as
an incentive for business to increase quality standards in order to avoid
exposure. Thereby the well-known phenomenon of “market for lemons”73
can be avoided. By creating uniform standards for quality coupled with
adequate remedies in consumer sales – which is the objective of Dir. 99/44
and its follow-up, the Weber-Putz-judgment of the CJEU mentioned above
– business will have a “level playing field” for marketing its products; it
cannot gain market shares by dumping prices and undercutting quality.
72 For a critique H.-W. Micklitz/N. Reich, Cronica de una muerte anunciada, 46 (2009)
CMLRev 471 at 507 (consumer sales), and 510 (unfair terms).
73 G. A. Akerlof: The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.
In: Querterly J. Ec.. 84 (1970) 488-500.
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Interestingly, the author Grundmann74 who sides more with the critical
economic analysis of EU consumer law being sceptical with mandatory
provisions, hails the outcome of the Weber-Putz case as the “recognition
of a strict liability system in a chain of contracting conceiving contracts
not in isolation but embedded in markets.”
3.3. The Evasive Concept of “Vulnerable Consumer”

The concept of “vulnerable consumer” has only recently entered EU
consumer law, and it is not yet clear how it can be relevant in consumer
contracting – perhaps outside the special case of services in the public
interest like telecommunication and energy once they have been privatised.
As compensation to privatisation, EU law has imposed so-called universal
service obligations on providers which also aim to protect vulnerable
consumers, particularly the handicapped and the poor consumers. Consumer
law is linked to social law – a difficult relationship which has to be regulated
by Member States themselves and maybe quite different from country to
country. In this case consumer law must find how to fairly distribute risks
of consumers who are unable to pay their bill but still have a right to some
basic supply. In the EU this is left to Member State law, and there are no
general principles cognisable at the moment. The protection of vulnerable
consumers points to important redistributive effects of contract law which
according to mainstream economic theory should not be part of it.75
On the other hand, freedom of contract gives every market participant
the right to enter into contracts – or not – for whatever reason. Only certain
types of discrimination are forbidden, as I mentioned with regard to gender
– but even this poses problems as I will show in the next section. But
vulnerability of consumers is not such as to restrict freedom of contracting.76
74 St. Grundmann, Consumer Sales, in: E. Terryn et la, Liber amicorum J. Stuyck
(Intersentia Cambridge) 2013, 725 at p.742.
75 For a broader discussion see Reich, General Principles…, para 1.20, based on T.
Wilhelmsson, ‘Varieties of Welfarism in European Contract Law’, (2004) ELJ, 712; see
C. Mak, Fundamental Rights in European Contact Law, 2008, at 286-289; N. Reich in:
R. Schulze/H Schulte-Nölke, European Private Law, 2011, 57.
76 On the importance of the principle of (framed) freedom of contract see Reich, General
Principles… para 1.12.
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Contracting is a two-side affair, and protecting one side means putting
an additional burden on the other. If the professional is not aware of the
vulnerability of the consumer – or could not reasonably be aware of it –
under traditional contract law doctrine there seems to be no reason to put
an additional burden on him – perhaps with the exception of minors who
traditionally enjoy a special protection. In the age of internet contracting
this will be even more difficult to verify the eventual vulnerability of the
consumer. As mentioned above, recital 34 of the recently adopted CRD
mentions the particular information needs of vulnerable consumers, but
does not put any legal consequence on an eventual lack of such information.
3.4. 	Non-Discrimination

in

Insurance Contracts – A New Source

of

Inequality?

The collective dimension of EU consumer law has been mentioned
briefly, and its main impetus has been on giving consumer associations
a right of action against unfair, intransparent and misleading business
practices and pre-formulated contract terms. This remedy seems to work
quite well if the cost-barriers can be overcome, with however the exception
of compensation where EU law has shunned away from providing any
remedies of its own.
Non-discrimination law in consumer markets is a new issue in EU law,
and the mentioned Test-Achats-case gives a flavour of what may come in
the future. The outcome of the judgment is quite paradoxical and maybe
even against the very consumer interest which was seemingly promoted by
the Belgian plaintiff which is a consumer association itself. As a result of
the necessity to offer only unisex insurance contracts in motor insurance
disrespecting the particular risks of male drivers which usually have a
much higher accident rate than women, and in health and life insurance
where women in the EU (this may be different in India?)77 due to longer
77 See the provocative book by J. Drèze & A. Sen, An Uncertain Glory – India and its
Contradictions, 2013, in particular Chap. 6 on “India’s Health Care Crisis” hitting in
particular Indian women!
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life expectancy are “costlier” on the insurance market, there is a tendency
now in the EU of a general premium increase for so-called “new contracts”
from 21 December 2012 on; exact statistical material is however not
yet available. As critical law and economics experts have noted several
times, consumer protection – whether via mandatory rules or via nondiscrimination provisions comes at a price, and it remains a question of
economic efficiency and political legitimacy whether people are willing
to pay this price. This however is not a legal question.
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B. The Different Consumer Images in EU Law
EU image

Legislation

CJEU Case Law

Critique

The informed
consumer
standard

Transparency of terms,
Dir. 93/13 and other
Dir,
Positive information
duties, Dir. 2011/83
Rights of withdrawal
Detailed information
requirements in
consumer credit

Case C-362/88 – GB
Inno
C-470/93 – Mars –
C-465/98 - Darbo
CJEU “average,
reasonably wellinformed and
reasonably observant
and circumspect
consumer”

“Information
overflow”
Lack in adequate
information format
Fictitious model of
consumer rationality
Behavioural studies
show limits of
information

The weak
consumer
standard – its
collective
dimension

Fairness of preformulated terms, Dir.
93/13
Mandatory conformity
standard in consumer
sales, Dir. 99/44

Case C-137/08 –
Penzügij Lizing: “...
according to settled
case-law, the system of
protection introduced
by the Directive is
based on the idea
that the consumer is
in a weak position
vis-à-vis the seller or
supplier, as regards
both his bargaining
power and his level of
knowledge.”

“Legal paternalism”
Absence of free choice
of consumers?
Cross-subsidy of
careful consumers to
careless consumers?
What about small
traders?

The vulnerable
consumer
standard only
in exceptional
cases
Concept
vulnerability:
intellectual,
physical,
economic

Art. 5 (3) Dir. 2005/29
Recital 34 of Dir.
2011/81:
“In providing that
information, the
trader should take into
account the specific
needs of consumers
who are vulnerable
because of their
mental, physical or
psychological infirmity,
age or credulity in a
way which the trader
could reasonably be
expected to foresee.
Air passengers with
“reduced mobility”
according to Reg.
261/2004
Dir. 2014/92: basic
financial services

Case C-12/11
McDonough – flight
interruption – due to
volcanic eruption:
“the provision of care
to such passengers
is particularly
important in the case
of extraordinary
circumstances which
persist over a long
time and it is precisely
in situations where
the waiting period
occasioned by the
cancellation of a flight
is particularly lengthy
that it is necessary
to ensure that an air
passenger whose flight
has been cancelled can
have access to essential
goods and services
throughout that period”.

“Who pays the bill”?
Redistributive
effects of regulations
protecting weaker
consumers!
Limits of solidarity in
contract law?
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Need for a
differentiated
approach

More empirical studies
needed

Problems of
subsidiarity +
proportionality, Art 5
TEU

Choice of legislator
depending on culture,
income of population

C. The Consumer Image in Indian Law

Includes the Consumer Image in India Law, its missing collective
dimension, and absence of preventive mechanisms for protection before
contracting – Reform suggestions of the Indian Consumer Protection Act
of 1986 (CPA) as amended
1. In order to improve the protection of the collective interest of Indian
consumers, there is a need for a paradigm extension in Indian consumer
law and practice under the CPA. Such extension would imply action
under the CPA from compensation only to both compensation and
prevention.
2. This paradigm extension implies both legislative and institutional
changes, but in no way radical modifications of the existing structure
and practice under the CPA.
3. As a first requirement, preventive jurisdiction against unfair trade
practices (UTP), in particular misleading & unfair advertising
should lie exclusively with the State Commissions, eventually the
National Commission, not with District Fora. Such centralization and
concentration of proceedings would accelerate the complaint handling
which in the end would be monitored by the possibility of an appeal
to the Supreme Court of India.
4. As a second important reform to be enacted by the Indian legislator,
there is a need to modify existing legal restrictions to improve
prevention, in particular by broadening the jurisdiction under Sec.
12 to cover practices also before any commercial transaction with a
consumer has taken place, similar to Sec. 36A MRTP Act of 1984 as
repealed, Art. 3 (1) EU Dir. 2005/29. The concept of consumer needs to
be widened to include cases where there has been no express transaction
for consideration, but its preparation via advertising or solicitation.
5. The remedial mechanism should be improved with a view to attain rapid
cessation orders against obvious UTP, including interlocutory/interim
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injunctions to be sought by “recognized consumer associations” under
Sec. 12 (b), consumer groups under Sec. 12 (c) and/or governments
under Sec. 12 (d) CPA. Individual consumers should not have standing.
6. Whether trade associations should have standing like under EU law and
the former MRTP-Act must be decided by the legislator. This author
is convinced that a broadening of standing to include also business
actors would increase the preventive effect of the CPA, but strictly be
limited to preventive, not to compensatory jurisdiction.
7. In order to allow a speedy out of court settlement of a case concerning
an UTP, an informal pre-trial “warning procedure” would be helpful
as used in many EU countries. It could be initiated by consumer
organizations, consumer groups and governments having standing
under Sec. 12 CPA, eventually also by trade associations. If the trader/
advertiser complies, he would sign an undertaking to abstain from
continuing the UTP, sanctioned by a conditional penalty in case of
breach.
8. It is suggested that the already existing remedies under Art. 11 (2) CPA,
including accelerated procedures for orders with “interim effect”, could
be activated to allow for rapid injunctive relief.
9. Orders by State Commissions or the National Commission enjoining a
specific UTP should be accompanied by a conditional penalty payment
in case of breach. If the order has been appealed, the penalty payment
would only be preliminary and has to be revoked in case of a successful
appeal by trader.
10. Under existing law, neither the State Commissions nor the National
Commission have investigative powers, unlike the former MRTPCommission. In the opinion of this author, this principle should not
be abandoned because of the judicial character of the Commissions. It
would therefore be part of the substantiation requirements of an action
for an injunction by the plaintiffs as mentioned under paras 5/6, to
submit the necessary documentation to the Commission to justify a
claim. If consumer associations do not have the means to provide the
necessary documentation, this must be done by the state plaintiff under
Sec. 12 (d) CPA. The defendant advertiser could obviously rebut the
claim by appropriate counter-evidence. The Commission could use its
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own expertise and knowledge of the deceptiveness of an adverting, or,
as the case may be, consult an independent expert to assess the claims.
It could however not take action proprio motu.
11. The proposed “paradigm extension” of the CPA should not undermine
the traditional consumer protection role of its institutional structure,
in particular by the jurisdiction of the District Fora for compensation
and/or restitution which should remain untouched, but be supplemented
by elements of a better preventive control in order to avoid consumer
harm before a contract is entered into. Some legislative changes as
indicated above will be necessary for this objective. On the other hand,
the existing CPA already contains elements to protect the collective
consumer interest, in particular in its provisions on standing (to be
extended to trade associations), compensation (exemplary and/or
punitive) with deterrent effect), and remedies for injunctive relief.
However, proceedings need to be accelerated – late justice is no justice!

69

